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I.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW "

Appellant pleaded guilty to forcible

sexual abuse of a young

man named SteveTrotter Jr. on the basis of a plea bargain
by the prosecutor.

(Appendix

1).

offered

Three counts were dismissed

Appellant would not be sentenced under the mandatory minimum
visions which might apply

in this case.

read the statements ma.de by

ti le purported

F u r t h e r , Appellant

the boy would tell substantially
witness

stand,

prohad

victim,, a young boy

had b e e n placed with him by a Social Service a g e n c y , and

who

believed

the same lies If brought

to the

Oi i 1:1: le • Dther hai id 1 le knew that his record was a b -

solutely c l e a r , that he had a history
both professionally

of service to the

and as a social w o r k e r committed

phan children and In fact because the p r e - s e n t e n c e

community

to helping

t e n d e n c i e s , the pre-sentence report practically

ed nothing more than an extended

probation.

or-

Investigator b e -

came aware of the unpure motives of the young accuser and his
iopathic

and

soc-

recommend-

This case before

Judge

Dean Conder is numbered CR85-623 and would not have come to the a t tention of this Court
ition of sentence

except

for the fact that prior to the i m p o s -

in that c a s e , Appellant was charged again

the mandatory minimum forcible

sexual abuse

statutes with

to another young b o y , Adam S.

This case resulted

under

respect

in a trial

before

H o n o r a b l e James Sawaya*In which Brian M i l d e n h a l l was found guilty
one of the two charges against him.
at his trial

As Bryan declared under

oath

"the charges that Adam has made against me are word

*85-o68 consolidated herewith

1.

of

for word the very same ones that Steve Trotter made against me.T!
(Transcript of trial at p. 230, lines 23-5).
ered CR85-968.

This case is numb-

As Bryan testified (Transcript at p. 228, line 13

through p. 232, line 15) Appellant told this young boy whose mother
had requested he care for him, his brother and sister while she left
the state, and for whom he had served as a surrogate parent the
previous two years without incident.

Appellant told Adam S. of

what Steve Trotter had accused him of.

Several weeks later Adam S.

accused Bryan of those same crimes.
The trial of Appellant before Judge Sawaya was marred by
false evidence presented in rebuttal to his alibi.

Although Ap-

pellant had requested full discovery in this matter, the information Appellant was not informed that the witnesses would be presenting the evidence that they did, which evidence proved false but
weakened Appellant's alibi sufficiently to result in the jury finding him guilty of one of the counts, despite the contradictory testimony of the victim himself.
Further, economic motives for the victimTs mother to lie
were presented (Transcript at p.241 lines 5 - 1 0

and p. 133>

lines 13 - 20).
Further, the mental condition of the purported victim1s
mother, Gwen Rayer, was raised (Transcript at p. 162, line 5 and
p. 163) it was important to show that irx addition to ths economic motives (Gwen Rayer had not p^id Appellant for taking care of
her children w M l ? she left the state and before returning to live
in tne Salt ^JKZ

n

r;is.'ai.

~e. :^r ;

See Transcript it vv.

163-66 )

Judge Sawaya refused to allow the records from Granite Mental

p

Health showing the schizophrenic nature of Gwen Rayer (Transcript

p. 305 - 309).
Because it was necessary to have Bryan Mildenhall testify
to how Adam S. learned of the sexual acts of which he had told
his mother Bryan, Appellant, had perpetrated on him it was necessary to bring in the issue of the previous guilty plea.

At first

the purported victim denied he had heard about Steve Trotter and
Bryan and sex, as follows:
Q.

(by Mr. Macri)

Is it (previous testimony) dif-

ferent from what you said today, that

you didnft know anything

about Steve and Bryan and sex?
A.

(by Adam S.)

Yeah.

(Transcript at p. 128 , lines 4 - 6 e_t seq. )
Finally this Court should be aware that much of the first
jury panel had to be excused because of their prejudice against
Appellant because he had pleaded guilty in the first instance (see
dismissal of jury panel lines 23 - 25, p. 30 through line 30,
p. 32). It is inescapable fact that the circumstances of the
charges left Bryan Mildenhall no opportunity for a fair trial.

This

set of conditions was exacerbated when on February 18, 1986 Appellant's attorney received a notarized letter which has been included in the record which letter was signed by Steve Trotter Jr.
and notarized in his handwriting wherein he declared

,?

I heard

from one of my friends that my ex foster dad Bryan Mildenhall was
found guilty of a sex crime about Adam/
this because I know he couldnTt do it.

I feel very bad about
It did not happen with me

the way I first said it did and I wanted to clear him of my charges.

3.

Bryan did not force me to do anything".

(Appendix 2)

Based on this unsolicited letter Appellant requested to withdraw his guilty plea and moved to have the prejudicial references
of the first guilty plea, which so drastically affected the jury
and led to conviction of the one count despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary3 be set aside.

Both Judge Conder and Judge

Sawaya denied Appellant the opportunity and thus he must turn to
this Court for justice and mercy..
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
EITHER ONE OF THE CASES IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
AND AT BEST TWO ABUSES OF DISCRETION; TOGETHER
THEY ARE A SYNERGY OF INJUSTICE
Case 85-623y to which Defendant initially pleaded guilty3
and for which he faced sentencing became subject of a Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea in a series of appearances geginning March 14,
1986.

This Motion was denied and Appellant appealed.

The Code

Section involved, 76-5-404 U.C.A. requires the act to be done "to
arouse and gratify the sexual desires" and "without the consent
of (the victim)".

Initially Appellant believed the complaining

victim who was blackmailing him5 would tell the same lies on the
stand as he had told police.

When the notarized confession from the

boy was received (Appendix 2) he felt he must withdraw his plea.
Judge Conder disagreed and sentenced him to serve time concurrent
with the second case.
After AppellantTs conviction in the first case but before
his sentencing, he was again charged with a similar crime in
85-0968.

He was convicted by a jury.

4.

Again, before sentencing,,

when he received the notarized confession (Appendix 2) he moved
for a new trial since the plea in the first matter on which his
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was pending, so prejudiced the proceedings that a fair trial was not possible.

This Motion for New

Trial was denied and Appellant was sentenced to mandatory minimum sentence of five years.

The appeals in both cases have been

consolidated herein.
ARGUMENT ONE
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANT TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA IN CASE 85-623Judge Conder had difficulty throughout the proceedings with
the complex fact situation in this case.

He was concerned with

the alleged victim1s age (Transcript of 85-623 at p. 2, line 15,
inter alia).

The information in the case had been amended to place

the alleged crime in June of 1982 (see Appendix 1). Further, Appellant presented a certified copy of birth of the alleged victim
to the Court which the Court finally acknowledged (Ibid at p. 133
lines 21 - 25 and p. 12 lines 18 - 22, also, p. 11 line 20 where
the Court states "it has been so amended in the Information).
The Court was "gravely concerned" (Ibid at p. 14, line 12)
and stated"(. . . and then you say if I assume all of Mr.
MlldenhallTs facts to be true, then it!s unjust for Mr. Mlldenhall
to have entered a plea of guilty. . . ")

(Ibid at p. 15, line 6

-18).
Part of the CourtTs confusion came from the Prosecutorfs
insisting that the alleged victim was under the age of 14 (see,
for example, Ibid at p. 13, lines 23 - 25). The boy had not even

5.

been introduced to Appellant before he was 14 years of age .(rbid. p.2, 2?-;
The Court heard the notary's testimony which it acknowledged
(Ibid at p. 14, see lines 2 - 6

and 21 - 25, inter alia) but for

some reason has not been transcribed.

Appellant will move to sup-

plement the record for the details of the notaryrs testimony but
this Court can infer (because itTs true) from the dialogue cited,
combined with Appellantrs identification of Steve TrotterTs handwriting (Ibid at p. 4, line 3 - 4 )

that the boy had issued the con-

fession and recant of his charges voluntarily.
The problem why the Prosecutor didnTt want to have the case
tried after the confession was that the alleged victim, who had
been committed to a State Youth Facility for his criminal activity,
was on the run and nowhere to be found (Ibid at p. 4, lines 4 -9)
and they had no way to find him.

Rather than give Appellant the

benefit of the doubt, and put the sociopathic victim who admitted
he lied, on the stand, the Prosecutor pressed for Appellant to be
forced to abide by his guilty plea.
This is despite the fact that the purported victim alleged
that he had set the whole situation up for the blackmail of
Appellant, which was a fact that, without the purported victim1s
confession appearing in Appendix 2, Appellant would have been
unable to prove.
The decision to deny Appellant's Motion for Withdiswal of his
Guilty Plea is unjust given Mr. Mildenhall's poignant explanation
for his Guilty Plea (Ibid at p. 17, line 5 et^ seq. through p. 18,
line 25). This is particularly true when the recantation of the
alleged victim had been received and acknowledged and the Court's

6.

confusion on the issue.

The Guilty Plea should have been with-

drawn and Mr. Mildenhall should have been allowed a trial.

It

would have been no more expensive and burdensome to the State
than this Appeal or incarceration, and the general principle of law
is that a Defendant must be given every benefit of doubt.
ARGUMENT TWO
THE PROOF OF A BIASED JURY, UNCONTROLLABLE
BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT REMEDIAL
BY THE COURT.
It is because the Guilty Plea in the first case when Defendant was set up by another purported victim that second case was so
colored by the first conviction that a fair trial was impossible.
First, the Court should be aware that the jury was qualified as
being amenable to the first degree felony as charged and the minimum mandatory jail term (p. 19 and 20, Transcript of CR85-968).
Consider also the CourtTs considerations in this case.
Second, in order tofhave Mr. Mildenhall testify to how the
alleged victim learned of the sex acts he was alleging, Mr. Mildenhall
would have to take the stand.

In order to have him take the stand

it was necessary to qualify the jury on the issue of the previous
conviction.

(Ibid at p. 28, lines 15 e_t seq. )

At least six persons in the jury panel indicated the previous conviction would affect their feelings and seven members of
the jury panel were thus excused (see p. 30 and p. 31) the jury
panel was excused and a supplemental panel was called in on the next
day (Ibid at p. 32, line 7 ) .
If Defendant is actually guilty of the first criminal charge
(and it should be pointed out that he had made some unqualified in-

7.

criminating statements to the police prior to consulting with an
attorney, which incriminating statements still might not have
merited a guilty plea had Appellant known the lies were going to
be subsequently recanted by the first "victim"), then the fact
of the conviction should properly have been before the jury if Mr.
Mildenhall planned to take the stand.
In this case, however, he had to take the stand to explain
why "the charges (the secondAvictim) has made against me are word
for word the very same ones that (the first victim) made against
me."

(Ibid at p. 230, lines 2 3 - 2 5 ) There was no other way that

he could defend himself and the confession of the first victim
had not yet been received.

In fact, as this Court can see from

the letter included as Appendix 2 herein, had it not been for the conviction in the second case, the boy who complained in the first
case would never have written his notarized recantation.
From the description of the pastoral relationship of
Appellant to Adam S. for two years prior to the alleged sexual abuse,
a jury could very easily have concluded that the victim was lying
or sleeping and dreaming had it not been for the fact of the first
conviction.

Since Appellant had nver believed his actions would

lead to a second set of charges and because he wished to avoid
the appearance of evil, he made efforts to terminate the relationship with the boy he had rescued from a psychologically ill mother
aand a transient home situation along with his brother and sister.
He told the boy on June 29th of 1986 what had happened with the
first bov and told him,.he Mould be.unable to see bim^agais..

8.

The boy continued to call Mr. Mildenhall and In fact testified on
p. 88 of the Transcript after the first alleged incident that

tT

I

have known him for two years and couldn't believe that he could have
did that."

(Ibid at line 1).

The jury hung on the issue of whether or not sexual abuse
occurred on the night of June 29, 1985.

The reason they hung is

because the boy contradicted his own statement and admitted that
Bryan picked him up on the 30th at the boyTs own home (compare
the "boy's testimony in the transcript p. ??8 with earlier contradictions)
As will be discussed in the next argument we also believe
that the jury accepted on face value the false statements of certain
witnesses to justify itTs prejudiced view of the case because of the
first conviction.

On p. 408 of the Transcript the Court will note

that Ann Pettus5 a University of Utah communications student, had
done a jury study in this trial and we offered to show the effect
the false testimony had on the jury as a result of her extensive
jury study.

This was denied.

We believe the taint of the first conviction so colored the
second case that a fair trial was impossible.
ARGUMENT THREE
REBUTTAL WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE STATE GROSSLY
MISREPRESENTED THE TRUTH; THAT IS, LIED
The airtight alibi defense of Appellant resulted from, the
testimony of several persons in his CB Club with relationship to
the events of July 65 1986, the night the lights went out in Utah.
This Court will recall that the jury was hung on the allegations of June 293 1985 for the reason that the boy contradicted

9.

himself severely, photographs and other confirmatory data indicated that the boy was mistaken, if not perjuring himself, and
still three of the eight jurors found him guilty (ibid p. 403 404).
The issue of the time during the night of the blackout became
crucial and the jury believed the prosecutorTs position despite the fact
that the witnesses for the prosecution did not tell the truth as
will be demonstrated below.
As Appendix 3> Defendant presents his Motion for Discovery;
as Appendix 4 his Notice of Alibi Defense and as Appendix 5 the
Prosecutorfs response on discovery.

The Court will note that the Pro-

secutor on p. 410 of the Transcript, lines 5 - 1 2

suggests that

it was not necessary to inform Appendant that these witnesses,
who testified falsely, would be called.
That the time sequence is important is clear.

That the

statements made by the rebuttal witnesses were false is equally clear.
The crucial testimony regarding time appears on p. 333 of the Transcript where Officer James Burns

called as the witness at the in-

stance of the State and duly sworn testified as a police officer
for Salt Lake City that he was requested to contact the alibi witnesses.

On p. 332 at line 22 and thereafter Officer Burns test-

ifies to the times relevant to the alibi.

He testifies in line 21 -

23 on p. 33 that he checked police records and concludes the alibi
was untrue.
Appendix SB^ated March 10, 1986 is a statement from the director of records who declared that the times mentioned in the police
report of the burglar alarm failure are inaccurate and do not reflect

10.

the actual time of the incident.

This document was secured long

after the trial was concluded in order to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the officer?s unexpected testimony.

The officer admits

on p. 3363 line 9 and 10 that "I took most of my information from
the actual police report."

Because the electricity went out that

night, all the computers were off and the 0000 readingsiwhich both
Officer Burns on p. 337 of the Transcript lines 1, 2 and 3 and Officer Pat Smithfs testimony p. 325 at line 22 - 23 were inaccurate.
The 0000 readings on which the jury depended, according to the jury
study which was not admitted were not the result of accurate
timeing but in fact the result of a computer malfunction.

If

Judge Sawaya had permitted the jury study information to be admitted
this Court could see that Bryan Mildenhall!s alibi would have been
confirmed, and the false rebuttal testimony is what the jury actually
curt

believed.

(See a l s o Appendix 5 CA showing a c t u a l reports)

One could excuse Officer Smithrs testimony an error had it
not been for the fact that on p. 3273 line 16, in response to the questquestion "are you certain whether or not it might mean that the
electricity was not operating on the clock that was recording this?"
She replied "yes, I am certain."

Further, to support her false

statement, she continues on line 17 in answer to the question "so
what you are suggesting is from this report that both the complaint, the assign*ment and arrival were absolutely simultaneous?"
"yes, thatTs not unusual."

When pressed she indicated that she

frequently saw 0000.
Similarly false testimony was elicited from Kelly Astill as

11.

a rebuttal witnessfor the State.

Mr. Astill was in charge of the

Utah Power and Light records for the area where the alibi witnesses
and Mr. Mlldenhall were at the time of the alleged offense of which
Mr. Mlldenhall was found guilty.

He brought the records to Court

with him and this is recounted on p. 3^3 of the Transcript.

Mr.

Astill testified that the power in the area went on at 10:5^ P.M.
in the evening.

(Ibid at p. 3^4, line 15 - 16).

Despite the fact that this unexpected witness testified to
these facts to the jury and stated so unequivocally Appendix 6 A,
B, and C indicate that this time was false.

The Court will see

in Appendix 6A that I inquired from Utah Power and Light whether a
statement such as Mr. AstillTs could be made without reservation.
Appendix 6B demonstrates his answer that it could not be so made.
Appendix 6C is a confirmatory letter of the next door neighbor to
the building housing the CB Club which confirms the trufchfullness of
the alibi witnesses1 version of the time which , if believed, would
have confirmed AppellantTs version of the facts which were truthful, and which, had the trial not been tainted by the previous convictior
and had Appellant been given the right to full discovery of the witnesses against him, would have led to his acquittal.
This is the measure of whether or not a new trial should be
granted; that is, whether a new trial would have a substantial likelihood of resul-ting in a different result.

Judge 3awayaTs denial

of the new trial under the circumstances, when he had this information available to him, was an abuse of discretion on his part and
AppellantTs Motion for New Trial in this matter should be granted.
In view of the mistatements of Salt Lake County Prosecution's wit-

12.

nesses, it is practically obligatory.

Although the decision is

discretionary with that court, State v. Conrad 540 p. 2nd 1264;
State v. Harris 513 P.2nd 438, still where the newly discovered
evidence contradicting unexpected rebuttal testimony is probably
seen to render different results probable on retrial of case a
decision denying a new trial may be an abuse of discretion (State
v. Harris op cit). As a general rule, suppression by prosecution
of material evidence favorable to criminal defendant violates due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of good
faith of prosecution and, at minimum, requires granting of new trial.
ARGUMENT FOUR
GWEN RAYER, MOTHER OF THE PURPORTED VICTIM HAD
A SECRET MOTIVE FOR PROSECUTING APPELLANT AND
A PREDIS-POSITION, WHICH APPELLANT WAS PREVENTED
FROM DEMONSTRATING TO THE JURY, TO DO SO.
Gwen Rayer was a hostile witness, not, Appellant submits,
because he had molested her son.

Actually, it was because he would

not give her money she would not pay him money that he requested,
and for which he was suing (Small Claims suit 85SC 7265 Salt Lake
City Department, and Circuit Court, State of Utah).

Mr. Vuyk the

Prosecutor acknowledges that the Small Claims Complaint against Ms.
Rayer couldpot be served because his address was concealed (lined
12 - 153 p. 172). Ms. Rayer admits on p. 151 at line 24 - 25 that
she owed Bryan Mildenhall money for taking care of her children
while she was in Florida on a futile financial excapade.

She re-

peatedly admits she did not pay him.
She admits on p. 161 of the transcripts, lines 2 - 1 2

that

she mispoke, at least, herself, at the preliminary hearing on the
issue of whether or not any of Adam's several stepfathers had pulled
13.

down his pants.

She admitted at the trial that they had.

despite the fact Adam himself regularly denied this fact.

This is
Further,

when Rayer GU p. 162 at line 15 admits she has had some psychological problems in the past.

On p. 163 at line 22 she admits that

her five years of psychological counseling terminated just a month
or so before his trial.

Further, she admi^t/ on p. 164 that she,

her husband and the three children were staying at the Salt Lake
Transient Shelter less than a block from the location of the CB
Club.

She also admits that it was her idea that Bryan take care

of her children.

It should also be pointed out that on p. 169 of

the transcript, lines 5 - 17 s Ms. Rayer admitted that her young son
had been having some serious drug problem and that she enlisted
AppellantTs help, since he was a nurse to help him with those problems .
Given his series of revelations from the testimony of Ms.
Rayer, Appellant maintains that the CourtTs characterization of the
financial issues as totally imaterial on p. 170 of the Transcripts,
line 1 - 9

were prejudicial to Appellant, and took away another

positive element for the presumed innocent Defendant.
This Court should also be aware finally, that despite the
fact Detective Pat Smith is quoted on p. 199 of the transcript at
lines 22 - 25 that nAdam S. said he was afraid to say no to Bryan
because his friend Graham Cunningham and Kim Peterson had been
murdered by Mr. Bishop.

He was afraid he might get killed if he

may say no", in fact the boyfs testimony as above recounted was
that he in fact did not believe that Appellant would do such sexual things to him and he in fact solicited AppellantTs company after the first offense which he alleged (and subsequently he denied
u n i T oath) and recounted earlier and on which the jury hung.

Had

Appellant been able to present the issues of Ms. Rayer?s financial
motives without the unfair characterization of the Court as above
recounted, or had Appellant been able to follow through on the information regarding Ms. RayerTs psychiatric institutionalization
(see, for example, transcript at p. 246, lines 4 - 1 0

and also the

arguments advanced by Appellant on p. 305 - 309). Appellant
may have even had a chance to overcome the prejudices of the jury
caused by his unfortunate, though well reasoned, Alford - type
guilty plea.

Despite the citations by the State to keep the mental

health records out of the Hearings, it is the position of Appellant
that the mental health records can be introduced for impeachment
purposes given the fact that Ms. Rayer gave self serving testimony
regarding her mental health.
ARGUMENT FIVE
HAD THE JURY NOT BEEN PREJUDICED AND A PAIR TRIAL
FOR APPELLANT POSSIBLE IN THE SECOND CASE THE PERFECTLY CORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT, PATRICIA
ASHFORD, SHIRIS ROSEBERY, ROBERT ASHFORD, DORIS
HODGEMAN, DIXlfGRONAMAN, ANNA LEE WHITEHOUSE AND
ARLENE GALLEGOS CREATED SUFFICIENT DOUBT TO HAVE
RESULTED IN AN ACQUITTAL AND THUS A NEW TRIAL WAS
APPROPRIATE.
Appellant had no sexual activity with Adam S.

(See for ex-

ample Transcript at p. 245, lines 19 - 25). This consistently runs
throughout his testimony.

Shirly Roseberry and her daughter

Patricia Ashford, members of Appellant's CB Club, both testified
that on the night when Appellant was allegedly molesting Adam S.,
he was actually at their home operating emergency procedures because of the power blackout and that he had returned Adam S. to
his (AdamTs own home which was in fact the home of his aunt and uncle).
(See eg. transcript at p. 268, line 5 through p. 272, line 4) and
subsequent crossexamination; (see also, transcript at p. 286, line
1C

1 through p. 293, line 7, as well as the testimony of Dective
A

Jim Burns regarding his conversations with the alibi witnesses in
pages 330 through 34l of the transcript).

Given this testimony

the sexual activities described by Adam S. were physically impossible and only the prejudice of the jury combined with the false
statements of Detective Pat Smith, Officer Jim Burns, and records
keeper Kelly Astill could have resulted in the Guilty Verdict.
With respect to the allegations of sexual activity on June
29, 1985 which were also made by the boy and on which the jury
could not find Appellant guilty, again the record is clear that on
that date Bryan was active in a CB Club meeting, the minutes of
which were produced and the testimony of Doris Hodgeman, Dixi^
Gron&man, Anna Lee Whltehouse and Arlene Gallegos all confirmed the
story which Adam S. finally told, recanting his previous testimony,
that Bryan Mildenhall was not with him on June 20th and he saw
him only briefly June 30th for a birthday party at BryanTs motherTs
home (see for example, transcript at p. 281, line 4 et_ seq to 283,
line 2; also, p. 259 lines 9 - p. 26l, line 24; p. 297, line 10
through p. 298, line 16).
ARGUMENT
Bryan Mildenhall, while not perfect, is not guilty of two
felonies.

Though he pleaded guilty in Judge ConderTs Court, it was

because he knew that his initial emotionally disturbed young accuser was going to lie and because he felt guilty that he had
been induced to behave in an ungentlemanly manner with respect to
his accuser.
The accuser, upon learning that a second accuser had fabricated accusations based on the first conviction, which fabrications
were believed because of the initial set-up by him, recanted his
accusations.

At this point several months of hearings were held

during which Appellant tried to locate the boy and failing that,
as the State failed that also, Appellant brought the notary who
had taken the boyTs statement, into Court.

Despite the CourtTs

confusion over the boyTs age (which confusion was finally resolved,
as shown above) the Court held that the Guilty Plea should stand.
Appellant suggests as he has throughout the criminal procedure that
had he known that this sociopathic boy could ever have been made
to tell the truth, he would not have pleaded guilty.

When the boy

did tell the truth he rightfully expected to receive the benefit
of this truth.

This benefit was denied him, contrary to elementary

standards of criminal due process.
With respect to the second case, the suppression of facts
and the secretion of witness capable of establishing the innocence
of the accused is highly reprehensible.

In practice, and this is

in many areas of American life*greater stress is placed on the importance of winning than on using the correct and legitimate means
for doing so.

In the second case Defendant was seriously handi-

capped by the first conviction which he could not withdraw, despite
the recantation of his serious charges.

In the second case, as

Appellant has pointed out, the accuser, with whom he is terminating his foster son relationship because of the previous conviction,
he used exactly the same words against him, despite the fact that
eveidence was overwhelming that the boy was fabricating the story.
The jury understood this with respect to one of the two counts in
the second Information but because of the lies told by reputable
witnesses brought in rebuttal by the Prosecution, they convicted him.
Appellant maintains that this was because of the lies and the
spurious first conviction which should have been tried.

IT,

CONCLUSION

A p p e l l a n t respectfully
matters remanded

requests that this Court Order

for new t r i a l .

This is not only fair to D e f e n d a n t ,

giving him the benefit of the doubt as required

in criminal

t i o n s , A p p e l l a n t also believes that the State will
follows:

both

prosecu-

save m o n e y , as

At least $20,000 a year would be spent for the five years

of the mandatory minimum prison term in this c a s e .
tion of the first alleged

a prior c o n v i c t i o n , and in light of truthful
relating

recanta

victim, it is clear that a successful

secution could not be brought against A p p e l l a n t .

testimony

With the

pro-

In the absence

rather than

of

falsified,

to A p p e l l a n t ' s a l i b i , Appellant believes he would

be acquitted

of this second c h a r g e .

Since A p p e l l a n t ' s

is supported

by the record, this Court would fulfill

contention

both

r eq u i r e -

ments of justice and m e r c y , when the issues on Defendant's

life is

so m o n u m e n t a l , to grant the remands and have both matters

retried.

Dated this 10th day of D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 6 .

s
Certificate
I hereby certify

of Mailing

I delivered

two—(-£-)"* c o p i e s of foregoing

A p p e l l a n t ' s brief to David Wilkinson's
B u i l d i n g , Salt Lake C i t y , Utah

o f f i c e , 236 State

84114 this 11th day of D e c e m b e r ,

1986.

Robert M a c r i , Esq.
Attorney for Appellant

-i Q
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\nnendix 1

(Mice of %
TED CANNON

fgj

County Attorney

May 22, 1985

Robert Maori, Esq.
Attorney at Law
354 East 600 East
SLC, UT 84111
Re:
Dear

MENDENHALL, Brian
Circuit Court No. 8SFS0870

State v.

Mr. Maori:

In assessing the above matter we would offer the following terms
in settlement:
Plead to:

COUNT I: 3°

( ,

.

,

x

i )

Other terms:

The State will then move to:
Amend count(s):
Dismiss count(s):

II through V

Dismiss case(s) number(s)
Date of Count I amended to JUNE 1982.
Other: State will submit sentencing on presentence report

The above offer is conditional upon it being accepted on or before
Pre-Trial Conference, and further that the defendant commit no crimes
between the time of this offer and sentencing.
Very truly yours,

Deputy County Attorney
231 East 4th South
D Investigative Agency
Don Harman
Special Agent in Charge
4th Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 363-7900

G Administration
Roger Livingston
Chief Deputy County Attorney
4th Floor
Q Justice Division
John T Nielsen Chief Deputy

D Civil Division
William R Hyde Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

I Recovery Division
Donald Sawaya Chief n»r»n
4th Floor
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Appendix 3

Hob^it

' a c r i , Esc* 20tn

35** East 600 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

r-i. j'U-soic
15 THE T1H TO JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
nm

nr*

\ •»

rr, r +

« •

...
:

_,.,,

. - T ^ - - . ^

*

MOTION ^OP DISCOVERY

Circuit Co'irt .^o. 85 *S 16U9
D i s t r i c t Court So:
gf/£g

'^ -%f*<»r •* t^n**"

To the County Attorney:
Please disclose and nresent all material, reports, presentations
and any docurents or other relevant materials vith regards to the prosecution
of the above entitled case to Defense attorney Robert Macri. please include all
documents relating ho rieetings of Adar Salisbury vith vour vitaes3 counseling unit.
Tated this ^th September, 1985*

* T^^JLL^isr /fl/ic<t i
Certificate of Delivery
I delivered a copy of the foregoing; to Tom Vuyk, County Attorneyfs Office, this
6th September, IQ85.
^-s

A-DDendix k

Robert ,racri, Zsq. 20^3
35U East ^00 South
Salt Lake ^ity, Utah 8U111
Tel. 36U-3018
IN THE $HIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
STAT? OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

NOTICE OF ALIBI DEFENSE

vs,
BRIAN XILDFIIHALL,
Defendant

(

Circuit Court No. 85 FS 16U9
District Court No: QcOL
Q
* > IV O

Comes now Defendant Brian Mildenhall through his attorney Rohert *'Tacri
to declare that with respect to the actually charged dates of the offenses
in the nresent action, as amended, i.e. June 29 3.nd July 6, 1985, Defendant
intends to nresent testimony of the records' keeper at the Pioneer Valley Hospital
where he worked and intends to work, 3^60 S. Pioneer Park Way West Vallev City
about being on call the weekends involved, as well as his own testimony as well
as the testimony of Shirley Poseberrv and Pat Ashford, residents of o3^ Soutn 300
West, Palt r.ake city about the night of the blackout in Salt 'Lake City and the fact
that 3rian "ildenhall was manning the CB emergency channel with then that note in
their hore; furthur, that he attended a CB club meeting on the night of June ?Q
with then at their home
Tated t-'i 3 6th Jentember, I985 •

'

/J

JL6.L<L^/^CI4

Certificate of Delivery
I delivered a ccoy of the foregoing to Tom Vuyk, 2o. Attorney1s Office, this 6th
Sertemb°r l°? q ,
/

r^LLzq

^t-i

Appendix 5

QMffce of % JSalt JIake fflount^ JVtinrit^
T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney

MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ
Chief Deputy County Attorney

September 11, 1985

Robert Macri
Attorney for Defendant
354 East 600 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

BRIAN MILDENHALL
Case No, CR85-0968

Dear Bob,
Enclosed you will find copies of the police reports,
witness list, etc., that you requested. The records from
visits with our victim counseling unit are work product of
that unit and are not provided with discovery. If you need
any additional information, please advise me.

HEIDI BUCHI
Secretary
hab/001-04
enclosures
pc:

file

231 East 4th South
nstration
A Livingston
Deputy County Attorney
imtnKitrativp Affairs

O County Attorney Victim Services
Julie Branch
Director
4th Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
jB Justice Division
Walter R Ellett
Chief Deputy
3rd Floor

•

(801) 363-7900

Investigative Agency
Don Harman
Special Agent in Charge
4th Floor

D Civil Division
William R Hyde
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

O Governmental Services
Donald Sawaya
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

ww-tc
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^ ^
j^^jtrxwtwuuKjHwi^ i
^.^^..X^*.^ a
M ~ _ l

E L

' "BUD" W! LL0UGHBY
CHIEF OF POLICE

450 SOUTH THIRD EAST
TELEPHONE 535-7222

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
March 10, 1986
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

fe
-^

This is to certify that the attached Case Number (s) 85-62066 Please note
that the times listed on the top of the report are inaccurate and do not reflect
the actual times of the incident. Computer crash,
is/are a full, true and correct copy or the original in my custody. This
is in compliance with Rule 44, State of Utah, Proof of Official Record,
Section (a) Authentication of Copy and Section (b) Certified Copy of
Record read in Evidence.
This letter is signed and notarized to be a true and certified copy by
one of the Command or Management level personnel of the Salt Lake City
Police Department Records Unit.

&Ap&mll3iii

or

Director of Records

or
Lieutenant of Records

Captain of Records
SUBSCRIBgi--MD SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

/(Qlrl¥

Hotiry P^a*r~
My Commission expires

^/

/ /

, 19

DAY OF /J^Qy^

.

. 1986.
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CASE PRINTOUT

!P1
SAU LAKE CITY PMICf DFPT
CASF183062066
INCJ0507 07/06/8^ TIH 01 n WOO TIH AS!00100 |'IH ARVJOOJOO flM a ? 0 6 M l
ABDR: 300 y 600 s
ST
CITYISI. APT:
KAT:235
TYPE52298 BURG ALARH
CHP P O M CHP IDJ83F DSP P»: DSP 10:
PRI IDJF64
RP:HURPHY>BETTY
ABDR:
RES PH;S»5 SBAI
BUS PH:
HOW RCVO:T uuirsu DPF:P PRIJ3 SIJPJX
SIR SEQ:
LOCN'. 30OW 600S PREH Ml
6RIMHA15M JRS1CKJSI.P PRIOR ACT,

iu: 418 00:00 BUI:

mi

«J2;

BW:

CHTS:
IMR
HU-REP0RT
VERIFIED NCIC:2298 59907 JFALSEALARK WITH LICENSE
DISPOSITN: UNABLE TO LOCAFF:
CHTS:
CHTS:
NO SUCH ADltRESS:
CHTS:
am.
CANCELLED:
NO ACTION TAKEN!
CHTS:
CITATION ISSUED:
CHTS:
OTHER {EXPLAIN):
cms:

nn

END OF CASF
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CASE 85062066
'.CAUSF UNKNOWN
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Aupendix 6 A

Boberi N. Macri
Attorney at Lav

354 Cut 6CO South • 6alt Lake Gty, Ulan 54111
Tdromaw (SOI) 364-3018
February 2U, 1986

l!r. West Holmes
Utah ?owr and Light
1^07 West ^orth Tezrcle
Salt Lake City, Utah SUllS
Dear Mr. Holmes:
On the blackout date of July 6th and Tth power went cut at a house
located at 63k South West Temple in Salt Lake City.
The power resumption time is crucially important in a criminal case
that is ongoing and I understand that you have been informed that this is the
case.
I am told that the power went back on finally at 12:37 A.M. July 7th
and I need confirmation of this at your earliest convenience in order that
this criminal matter which is before the District Court may be resolved.
If there are any questions, please contact me as above,
Respectfully,

cc/file
client

AFPEHDIX 6B

UTAH POWER & L I G H T COMPANY
1 4 0 7 WEST NORTH TEMPLE S T R E E T
P. O. BOX 8 9 9

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84110
WES HOLMES
CLAIMS ADJU8TKB

soi-535-4027

March

Robert N. Macri
Attorney at Law
354 East 600 South
Salt Lake City, UT
Re:

12,

19 86

84111
July 6, 198 6, Power Outage

Dear Mr. Macri:
The power at 634 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah,
is supplied by Utah Power's Snarr Court No. 12 Circuit. To
the best of our knowledge, power was restored to that
circuit at 10:54 p.m. on July 6, 1985. This time, however,
applies only to the Snarr Court No. 12 Circuit in general
and not to any specific customers served by said circuit.
In an emergency situation such as this, primary emphasis is
placed on restoring power to the affected circuits and it is
possible that the power at a specific location was not
restored at exactly the same time as it was to the circuit.
Accordingly, we are not able to state the exact time
that power was restored to each individual customer on a
particular circuit.

Sincerely,

M

ryl^

Wes Holmes

